

1 Bingham McCutchen LLP
GRÉGOR Y LIPPETZ (SBN 154228)
2 Three Embarcadero Center
San Francisco, CA 94111-4067
3 Telephone: (415) 393-2000
Facsimile: (415) 393-2286
4 gregory.lippetz@bingham.com

5 Bingham McCutchen LLP
RICHARD S. TAFFET *Pro Hac Vice*
6 (NY SBN 1721182)
399 Park Avenue
7 New York, NY 10022-4689
Telephone: (212) 705-7000
8 Facsimile: (212) 752-5378
richard.taffet@bingham.com

9 Bingham McCutchen LLP
10 ROBERT C. BERTIN *Pro Hac Vice*
(VA Bar No. 42,478)
11 2020 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
12 Telephone: (202) 427-4126
Facsimile (202) 373-6413
13 r.bertin@bingham.com

14 Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
SANDISK CORPORATION

15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
16
17 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
18 SAN JOSE DIVISION

19 SANDISK CORPORATION,

20 Plaintiff,

21 vs.

22 LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC. and
23 ALCATEL-LUCENT, S.A.,

24 Defendants.

25 AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM
26

No. C 07-03618 JF

SANDISK'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Date: November 30, 2007
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Location: Courtroom 3

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Lucent's Opposition confirms that SanDisk's Motion for Summary Judgment (the
3 "Motion") should be granted.

4 *First*, Lucent has not made, and cannot make, any showing that SanDisk's players
5 encode. As SanDisk established in the Motion, this is required to establish infringement of each
6 of the claims of the patents in suit. Moreover, as to the '080 patent, Lucent makes no argument
7 to rebut SanDisk's showing that Lucent is judicially estopped from asserting that encoding is a
8 claim limitation for each claim in that patent. As to the '457 patent, Lucent concedes that it lacks
9 sufficient facts on which to even base a claim of infringement. Accordingly, SanDisk is entitled
10 to summary judgment of non-infringement as to both patents.

11 *Second*, Lucent does not contest - nor can it - that SanDisk is licensed to practice
12 the '080 patent. This, too, requires judgment in favor of SanDisk on its non-infringement and
13 license claims in connection with the '080 patent.

14 *Third*, SanDisk's showing that its players are capable of numerous non-infringing
15 uses, such as playing music files encoded in non-MP3 format, and playing music files encoded
16 by software that does not infringe the patents, remains unrebutted. Lucent also points to no
17 evidence - and it cannot - that SanDisk intended for its customers to practice any claim of the
18 patents. As such, a declaration that SanDisk does not indirectly infringe is also appropriate.

19 *Fourth*, Lucent's inability to defeat summary judgment is confirmed by the total
20 absence of any legally valid argument that the judgment in *Lucent Technologies, Inc. v.*
21 *Gateway, Inc.*, Case No. 3:02-cv-02060 (RWB) (the "*Microsoft* case"), is not binding for
22 purposes of this case, and that, consistent with that judgment, SanDisk's claims for declaratory
23 relief must be granted.

24 Faced with this situation, Lucent instead largely argues that this matter should be
25 stayed, purportedly for efficiency reasons, and that it should be permitted discovery, pursuant to
26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), before SanDisk's Motion can be decided. Neither argument is meritorious.
27 Lucent's arguments for a stay are insufficient to meet the burden required to avoid summary
28 judgment. Likewise, its request for discovery falls short because it fails to identify with

specificity, as it is required to do, a single “essential” fact that Lucent hopes to obtain through such discovery that would impact the determination of SanDisk’s motion. Indeed, no amount of discovery by Lucent will enable SanDisk’s players to encode music as required by the patents.

SanDisk incorporates by reference its Relief Sought, Statement of Issues to Be Decided and Statement of Undisputed Facts sections from SanDisk’s Motion for Summary Judgment as if fully set forth here to avoid unnecessary repetition.

II. ARGUMENT

A. This Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over SanDisk’s Claims

As a threshold matter, Lucent’s argument that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is easily resolved. First, Lucent has already agreed, in writing, not to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court over these claims. SanDisk filed its complaint in July after Lucent asserted both patents against SanDisk, stating that essentially all of SanDisk’s digital music players required a license to the patents in suit. Declaration of Gregory L. Lippetz (“Lippetz Decl.”), Ex. P. To facilitate licensing discussions, the parties negotiated a mutual non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”). Putting to rest any doubts as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in this action, Lucent agreed in the NDA “. . . not to contest that, as claimed by SanDisk in [this] Lawsuit, a dispute existed between the Parties sufficient to support an action for declaratory judgment at the time SanDisk filed its complaint in the Lawsuit.” Second Declaration of Gregory L. Lippetz (“Second Lippetz Decl.”), Ex. A at ¶ 14. The NDA, including the quoted language, has been executed by both parties, thus ending any dispute over the existence of subject matter jurisdiction over SanDisk’s declaratory judgment claims.

In addition to the NDA, Lucent’s conduct fulfills the “all the circumstances” test used to determine whether there is a substantial controversy between SanDisk and Lucent of sufficient immediacy to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment. As Lucent acknowledges, “Article III jurisdiction may be met where the patentee takes a position that puts the declaratory plaintiff in the position of either pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandoning that which he claims a right to do.” *SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.*, 480

1 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Defendants' Opposition to SanDisk's Motion for Summary
 2 Judgment ("Opp.") at 9. Lucent took the position, in writing, that the entirety of SanDisk's
 3 digital audio product line required a license to the patents. Lippetz Decl. Ex. P. SanDisk told
 4 Lucent that it did not need a license. Complaint, ¶ 20; Second Lippetz Decl., Ex. B. Thus, at the
 5 time SanDisk's complaint was filed, SanDisk was in the position of either selling arguably
 6 infringing digital music players or abandoning its digital music player product line.

7 Lucent argues that post-filing events weaken the existence of a controversy
 8 regarding the '080 patent, citing *Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.*, 495 F.3d 1340, 1346
 9 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Opp. at 8, 11. Lucent's reliance on *Benitec*, however, is misplaced. Unlike
 10 *Benitec*, where the parties both took the position that defendant's present activities were not
 11 infringing in light of a subsequent Supreme Court decision, here, the controversy regarding
 12 infringement remains, and has become stronger in the post filing period. Since the Complaint
 13 was filed, Lucent has counterclaimed for infringement of the '080 patent, thus further
 14 establishing the existence of a controversy. While Lucent has not filed a counterclaim of
 15 infringement of the '457 patent, Lucent states that SanDisk's players infringe the '457 patent if
 16 there exists associated encoding software that practices the patent. Opp. at 22. These facts
 17 demonstrated, and continue to demonstrate, that under "all the circumstances," there exists a
 18 substantial and immediate controversy.

19
 20 **B. SanDisk Is Entitled To Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement**

21 Lucent's Opposition fails to demonstrate the existence of any material fact in
 22 dispute that would preclude summary judgment of non-infringement. A nonmoving party may
 23 not rely on the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings in order to preclude summary
 24 judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Indeed, unsupported allegations or conjecture are insufficient
 25 to raise a genuine issue of material fact. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248
 26 (1986); *see also Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med., Inc.*, 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003).
 27 Furthermore, a plaintiff cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by merely restating
 28 conclusory allegations and amplifying them only with speculation about what discovery might

1 uncover. *Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service*, 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 1981);
 2 see also *Olympic Club v. Those Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's London*, 991 F.2d 497, 503
 3 (9th Cir. 1993) (a party's mere hope that further evidence may develop is an insufficient basis
 4 upon which to justify denial of summary judgment). Because Lucent fails to point to either an
 5 existing material factual dispute, or to specific facts that are likely to be uncovered that would
 6 create such an issue, summary judgment is appropriate.

7
 8 **1. Lucent Does Not Create A Material Issue Of Fact That
 SanDisk's Players Directly Infringe**

9 Lucent does not contest SanDisk's showing that its players do not encode music.
 10 Lucent concedes that, as SanDisk alleged, "SanDisk's MP3 players store and decode audio
 11 files." Opp. at 7. Lucent's expert, Dr. Polish, also confirms that SanDisk's players do not
 12 encode. Dr. Polish states that, while SanDisk players can store and decode audio files, third-
 13 party software, running on a computer, is used to encode music files. Declaration of Dr.
 14 Nathaniel Polish ("Polish Decl.") at ¶¶ 15, 18-19. Specifically, Dr. Polish loaded the Best Buy
 15 Digital Music Store Media Player onto his computer and "used the Best Buy product to 'rip' or
 16 encode music from an audio CD." Polish Decl. ¶ 15. In other words, Dr. Polish was required to
 17 use another device -- a computer running encoding software -- and not a SanDisk player, to
 18 encode. Of course this was necessary, as SanDisk's players themselves cannot perform the
 19 encoding step. The fact that some SanDisk players may come pre-loaded with a few encoded
 20 files does not change this fact. The players remain incapable of encoding, as is required by every
 21 claim of both patents-in-suit.

22 Lucent's argument that certain claims of the patents-in-suit do not require
 23 encoding fails for a number of reasons, including the fact that Lucent's own description of the
 24 invention is to the contrary. For example, Lucent describes the patents as being directed to
 25 "fundamental audio-compression inventions." Opp. at 5. Even as to the decoding and storing
 26 claims (claim 4 of the '080 patent, and claim 10 of the '457 patent, respectively), Lucent states
 27 that these claims are directed to aspects of a "compression system." Opp. at 5-6. But, only when
 28 SanDisk's players are combined with a non-SanDisk device, such as a computer, could SanDisk

1 players even arguably be considered to be part of a “compression system.” The players
 2 themselves, standing alone, are incapable of encoding, or compressing, audio files.

3 Moreover, as SanDisk has shown, Lucent is judicially estopped from arguing that
 4 claim 4 of the '080 patent does not include an encoding limitation, and in opposition, Lucent
 5 presents no argument (much less evidence) to the contrary. In the *Microsoft* case, Microsoft
 6 argued that a particular published document anticipated claim 4 of the '080 patent. In response,
 7 Lucent and its expert, Dr. Jayant, argued that the reference did not include all of the elements of
 8 claim 4 and, therefore, did not anticipate the patent. Lippetz Decl. Ex. H at 21. More
 9 specifically, to avoid invalidating the patent, Lucent stated unequivocally that “[u]ndisputed
 10 evidence establishes that claim 4 [of the '080 patent] incorporates each step of claim 1.” *Id.*
 11 Lucent’s assertion formed the foundation for the *Microsoft* court to uphold the jury’s finding of
 12 validity of the patent. Lippetz Decl. Ex. C at 25. Having successfully proven that claim 4
 13 “includes” each of the encoding steps of claim 1 of the '080 patent, Lucent is judicially estopped
 14 from now arguing that claim 4 does not require encoding. *See Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson*, 78
 15 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

16 The language in claim 10 of the '457 patent similarly demonstrates that the
 17 accused device must encode. Claim 10 describes “a” storage medium, and uses the terms
 18 “grouping,” “generating” and “quantizing” when discussing the creation of the audio signal.
 19 Lippetz Decl. Ex. I at 16:35-57. As discussed in SanDisk’s Motion, these explicitly claimed
 20 steps are critical to the encoding process. Motion at 5. Lucent does not allege, nor can it, that
 21 SanDisk’s players “group,” “generate” or “quantize” any audio signal because, to do so,
 22 SanDisk’s players would have to include hardware or software to encode audio signals. They do
 23 not.

24 Lucent’s supposed expert declarations do not compel a different conclusion, and
 25 certainly do not establish that SanDisk’s players include an encoding function. Both of Lucent’s
 26 declarants describe encoding being performed by software running on a computer, an encoded
 27 audio file being transferred onto the SanDisk player, and the storage or decoding of that file
 28 being performed by a chip on the SanDisk player. *See, e.g., Polish Decl.*, ¶ 15. If anything, this

1 confirms that the SanDisk players, themselves, do not encode, as they must to be within the
2 claims of the patents-in-suit.

3 Because Lucent's patents require that the accused device encodes music, and it is
4 undisputed that SanDisk's players do not encode, SanDisk is entitled to summary judgment that
5 it does not directly infringe the patents.

6 **2. SanDisk's License Precludes A Claim Of Infringement** 7 **Of The '080 Patent**

8 Lucent further does not contest the material facts that establish SanDisk's license
9 to the '080 patent. Lucent concedes that Fraunhofer has been found to be a co-owner of the '080
10 patent, with the right to license the patent. Opp. at 4. Lucent offers no rebuttal to SanDisk's
11 showing that SanDisk is licensed to the Fraunhofer MP3 patents, including the '080, through
12 Thomson. Motion at 7-8. Lucent does not even identify any need to discover any facts
13 regarding SanDisk's license in its request under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). See Affidavit of William
14 C. Mercer in Support of Defendants' Motion for Discovery Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) ("Mercer
15 Decl. ISO Discovery") at ¶¶ 5-9.

16 Thus, SanDisk is entitled to summary judgment that (i) SanDisk is licensed to
17 practice the '080 patent, and (ii) SanDisk cannot be liable for infringement of the '080 patent.

18 **3. Lucent Has Not Raised Any Issues Of Material Fact** 19 **Regarding Indirect Infringement**

20 As an initial matter, Lucent fails in its opposition to present any evidence that
21 would demonstrate the requisite direct infringement necessary to hold SanDisk liable for indirect
22 infringement. Motion at 19. Lucent does not contest that SanDisk cannot be liable for indirect
23 infringement when its players are used with non-infringing encoding software, such as WMP.
24 Lucent also fails to present any evidence of an MP3 encoder that infringes its patent. Instead, it
25 simply makes sweeping assertions regarding the infringing nature of MP3 encoders, which is
26 insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242,
27 248 (1986). In the instant circumstances, such assertions are particularly inadequate because it
28 has already been determined in the *Microsoft* case that the patents-in-suit are not essential to the

1 MP3 standard. Motion at 22; Lippetz Decl., Ex. C at 32.

2 Reference in Dr. Polish's declaration to the Best Buy Digital Music Store Media
3 Player cannot cure this failing. Significantly, Dr. Polish does not express any views regarding
4 whether or not the Best Buy software infringes either patent. Thus, since Lucent has not
5 demonstrated an issue of material fact as to direct infringement by others, SanDisk cannot be
6 liable for indirect infringement.

7 **a. SanDisk Cannot Contributorily Infringe Either**
8 **Patent As A Matter Of Law**

9 Lucent's Opposition makes clear that SanDisk's players have substantial non-
10 infringing uses so as to relieve SanDisk of liability for contributory infringement. Lucent
11 acknowledges that "SanDisk MP3 players support a variety of audio file encoding formats," such
12 as WMA, that do not implicate the patents. Opp. at 7. Thus, when SanDisk players are used to
13 decode and play music that was encoded in WMA format, they cannot be practicing either
14 patent. Lucent also acknowledges that SanDisk players can play music encoded by a variety of
15 encoding software. Opp. at 7, 21. The *Microsoft* judgment establishes that at least one brand of
16 encoding software, WMP, does not infringe the '457 patent. Lippetz Decl., Ex. G at 4.
17 Therefore, when SanDisk's players decode and play music that was encoded with software that
18 does not practice the patents, the patents can not be infringed.

19 The existence of these non-infringing uses of SanDisk's players is unrebutted, as
20 is the fact that these uses constitute substantial non-infringing use. This precludes a finding that
21 SanDisk contributorily infringes. See *Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Phillips Corp.*, 363 F.3d
22 1263, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Similarly, SanDisk's players' ability to play non-infringing music
23 demonstrates that the players were not designed to infringe the patents, and, thus, are staple
24 articles of commerce. See *Polysius Corp. v. Fuller Co.*, 709 F. Supp. 560, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1989).

25 **b. SanDisk Cannot Be Liable For Inducement**

26 The *Microsoft* judgment confirms that the '457 patent is not infringed by WMP,
27 and that, for at least Microsoft and SanDisk, a license exists to practice the '080 patent. Since
28 Lucent has failed to show an infringing use, it cannot, as a matter of law, demonstrate that

SanDisk intended for its customers to infringe either patent. Without intent to cause infringement, SanDisk cannot be liable for inducing infringement as a matter of law. *See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd.*, 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Lucent's sole argument to the contrary is that it should be "entitled to test SanDisk's blanket assertions regarding no indirect infringement." Opp. at 24. This, however, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. *See Olympic Club, supra*, at 503 (a party's mere hope that further evidence may develop is an insufficient basis upon which to justify denial of summary judgment).

C. Lucent Is Collaterally Estopped By The *Microsoft* Judgment

Lucent also cannot avoid the holdings of the *Microsoft* Judgment, and its arguments regarding issues of collateral estoppel are misplaced.

It is undisputed that the fundamental elements for application of collateral estoppel exist in this case. Lucent was a party to a prior action, the *Microsoft* case, had a full opportunity to litigate, and was the subject of a final judgment on the merits. *See Pharmacia v. Mylan Pharms., Inc.*, 170 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Moreover, none of the recognized grounds for disregarding the collateral estoppel effect of the *Microsoft* Judgment are present in this case. *See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore*, 439 U.S. 322, 332 (1979).¹ Specifically, applying collateral estoppel will not "reward" SanDisk for not joining the *Microsoft* action. SanDisk could not have joined the *Microsoft* action until Lucent asserted the patents against SanDisk in May 2007, well after the jury trial had already occurred. Lucent also had great incentive to fully and vigorously litigate the *Microsoft* case, having achieved a \$1.5 billion jury verdict. Nor is there any evidence that the *Microsoft* judgment is inconsistent with any prior decision. Finally, there are no procedural opportunities available to Lucent in this action that were not available to Lucent in the *Microsoft* case.

¹ The factors include whether (1) the application of offensive collateral estoppel would reward a plaintiff who could have joined in the previous action; (2) whether the party against whom estoppel is sought had the incentive to fully and vigorously litigate the prior case; (3) whether the prior judgment was inconsistent with any previous decision, and (4) the presence of any procedural opportunities available to the party against whom estoppel is sought in the subsequent litigation that were not available in the first action.

1 Lucent's attempt to recast the collateral estoppel issue into a determination on
2 whether SanDisk's Motion should be stayed is equally misplaced. No legal grounds exist for
3 such an approach, and Lucent offers none.

4 Lucent's arguments regarding judicial economy to support its stay request are
5 contrary to the facts at hand. First, the fundamental facts on which SanDisk's motion is based
6 will be unaffected by an appeal, thus there will be no judicial efficiency from allowing this case
7 to proceed to expensive and time consuming discovery. These facts include: 1) SanDisk's
8 players do not encode, 2) the patents-in-suit require encoding, 3) SanDisk's players are capable
9 of playing music encoded in non-patented formats, such as WMA, 4) SanDisk's players are
10 capable of playing music encoded by software that does not practice the patents-in-suit, and
11 5) SanDisk never encouraged any customer to infringe either of the patents-in-suit. Second,
12 unless and until SanDisk is relieved of potential infringement liability, it will continue to suffer
13 prejudice in the form of a cloud over its entire digital music player product line.

14 **D. Lucent's Rule 56(f) Request Should Be Denied**

15 Lucent's Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion is without merit and should be denied. In
16 making a Rule 56(f) motion, a party opposing summary judgment "must show (1) that [it has] set
17 forth in an affidavit form the specific facts that [it] hope[s] to elicit from further discovery,
18 (2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that these sought after facts are 'essential' to resist the
19 summary judgment motion." *California v. Campbell*, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998). The
20 party seeking a continuance bears the burden to show what specific facts it hopes to discover that
21 will raise an issue of material fact. *Hall v. State of Hawaii*, 791 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1986).
22 Failure to comply with these Rule 56(f) requirements is proper grounds for denying discovery
23 and proceeding to summary judgment. *Campbell* at 779. Lucent fails to meet its burden in
24 several ways.

25 Lucent fails to set forth the specific facts it hopes to elicit from discovery.
26 Lucent's supporting affidavit contains a list of *subjects* on which Lucent alleges discovery is
27 needed. *See* Mercer Decl. ISO Discovery. However, Lucent does not specify a single *fact* that it
28 hopes to elicit from such discovery. For example, Lucent seeks discovery into the technical

1 functionality of SanDisk's players, such as the source code. Opp. at 18. However, Lucent does
 2 not claim that such discovery would elicit evidence of a relevant *fact*, such as the fact that
 3 SanDisk players encode. Because Lucent fails to specify the facts it hopes to obtain through
 4 discovery, it fails to meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).²

5 Lucent also fails to show that the sought-after discovery is "essential" to resist
 6 SanDisk's Motion. The essential facts necessary to decide SanDisk's Motion and will not
 7 change even if Lucent is granted its requested discovery:

- 8 • SanDisk's players decode and store audio files, but do not encode;
- 9 • there are multiple music formats (WMA, etc.) that do not practice the patents-in-
- 10 suit;
- 11 • there exists music encoding software (such as WMP) that does not infringe the
- 12 patents-in-suit;
- 13 • SanDisk suggests that its customers use a variety of music formats;
- 14 • SanDisk suggests that its customers use a variety of encoding programs; and
- 15 • SanDisk has a license to the Fraunhofer MP3 patents, which includes the '080
- 16 patent.

17 Moreover, Lucent's expressed need for discovery to determine whether SanDisk
 18 infringes the '080 patent is undermined by the fact that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, Lucent must
 19 have had sufficient facts to demonstrate infringement before it filed its counterclaim.

20 Because Lucent failed to meet its burden of specifying particular, "essential,"
 21 discoverable facts that would defeat SanDisk's Motion, Lucent's request for discovery under
 22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) should be denied.

23 **III. CONCLUSION**

24 For the reasons set forth above, SanDisk respectfully requests that this Court grant

25
 26 ² Furthermore, much of Lucent's sought-after discovery, such as SanDisk's marketing materials
 27 and instructions to customers, have always been publicly available to Lucent. If Lucent truly
 28 believed such information would defeat summary judgment, it could have obtained and
 presented this information in opposition to SanDisk's motion.

summary judgment in favor of SanDisk for non-infringement of the '457 and '080 patents, and
for a declaration that SanDisk is licensed to practice the '080 patent.

DATED: November 16, 2007

Bingham McCutchen LLP

By: /s/ Gregory L. Lippetz
Gregory L. Lippetz
Attorneys for Defendant
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
SanDisk Corporation